creativity in the face of Africa's contemporary plight: 'Popular resourcefulness must be celebrated, but in any discussion of reshaping social and political structures its efficacy must be kept in perspective ' (1998: 11) . Mindful that Martin's argument is one of the longue duree, he argues that the continent 'demands something structural, and something immediate' (1998: 348). For Gifford, pentecostal ideology and practice must 'make sense' (1998: 55) and he is sure that 'sense' means the rapid change of political and economic structures.
AOGA, ZIMBABWEAN NATIONALISM AND THE RHODESIAN STATE
The social sources of the Zimbabwe Assemblies of God, Africa, were the artisans and casual workers who lived in Harare (Mbare) and Highfields during the late 1950s. These locations were two of Salisbury's oldest townships, which expanded during Southern Rhodesia's brief post-World War II industrial boom. The movement itself emerged from the South African-derived pentecostal church, the Apostolic Faith Mission (AFM). A collection of young pentecostal zealots-Joseph Choto, Raphael Kupara, Lazurus Mamvura, James Muhwati, Priscilla Ngoma, Caleb Ngorima and Abel Sande-formed a prayer band and choir around the charismatic evangelist Ezekiel Guti. This semi-autonomous group were expelled from the AFM in 1959 following a struggle with missionaries and an elder male fraction of the black leadership. The group subsequently joined the South African Assemblies of God of Nicholas Bhengu in association with the Pentecostal Assemblies of Canada. Once again they were expelled, and in 1967 they formed their own organisation, Assemblies of God, Africa (AOGA).
AOGA shared its birthplace with that of Zimbabwean nationalism, Highfields township, and it is clear that in their schism with the AFM the prayer band was emboldened by the spirit of nationalism prevalent in Highfields at the time. In 1961 Willard Wilson, the AFM's Missionary Overseer, not known for his racial tolerance, wrote:
To put it plainly we have had just about all we can take from the Blacks. These days they are so arrogant and hard to deal with, this coupled with the political situation, make it just about unbearable. There are times when I feel that my nerves will just about snap off in dealing with these people .. .5 Nevertheless, the nascent movement which became AOGA had no direct links with Zimbabwean nationalism. Its desire for black autonomy and sectarian purity was quite in keeping with the tradition of Zimbabwean pentecostalism in which it stood. The prayer band's zealous determination to preach wherever it felt called, unfettered by official expectations of missionary supervision, drew directly in inspiration and style on the linked traditions of Masowe and Maranke movements and the AFM.6
In its early life AOGA was highly sectarian. The movement was on 'social strike from society' whereas Zimbabwean nationalism was on 'strike against society' (Martin, 1990: 229; see also Hastings, 1979: 264) . As well as shunning gambling, the bioscope and the beer hall the black artisan membership of AOGA converted out of the nationalist movement into pentecostalism believing that the violent life styles of nationalist youth, supported by alcohol and marijuana, were incompatible with born-again sobriety7 and bodily purity.8 While the nationalist movement focused on the community and the workplace AOGA pentecostals initially met under trees, at home or in classrooms, focusing their energies on individual transformation and the renewal of the family. What nationalist reaction there was to this then small sect was favourable, given AOGA's emphasis on black autonomy, and the absence of any obvious links with white missionaries.9 Thus the movement resisted the engrossing tendency of Zimbabwean nationalism and pursued its own agenda within the pentecostal religious field. While ZANU and ZAPU fought for political control of Highfields, Southern Rhodesia's black capital, the prayer band waged a turf war with other pentecostal groups for control of the township's growing pentecostal constituency. The acrimonious nature of this struggle was the immediate reason for the group's expulsion from the South African-Canadian pentecostal umbrella in 1967. 10 Despite its assertion of black autonomy, AOGA still associated with born-again whites to procure resources for evangelism and church construction. The Pentecostal Assemblies of Canada provided sponsorship of black pastors and tents and transport for evangelistic crusades. As relations began to sour with the Canadians the prayer band increasingly drew on the patronage of an English businessman, Alexander Warrilow. He also provided them with assistance for their crusades, helped roof their first Highfields church and perhaps financed Guti's studies in the United States.1l Warrilow was cast as 'European Adviser' to the movement. White patronage was also needed in representations to the state, given that all Churches were still supposed to be under white supervision. Here the prayer band was assured of a smooth ride, owing to Warrilow's friendship and business links with the early 1980s reveal his fixation with administrative procedures and rules, but also a willingness to break them for kin and clients. 17 In his endeavours to modernise the movement Guti was aided by a new white ally, Alistair Geddes. Before meeting Guti at CFNI, Dallas, Geddes had been a member of the Rhodesian police force (Lindsay, 1976: 228-32 There can be no doubt that American sophistication and connections enhanced Guti's position within the movement. Prior to his period in the United States he had been perhaps little more than first among equals within AOGA. Abel Sande, for instance, had won much respect as an evangelist, while Raphael Kupara had a good deal of administrative clout. But Guti's new-found contacts provided him with an unrivalled source of patronage. Not acknowledging the sources of his funding, it appeared as if the new church structures were financed out of his own pocket.20 Guti dominated executive meetings, discoursing on ideas about Church growth and administration. By the late 1970s the leadership cult which so characterises the contemporary movement had begun to emerge.
These developments within ZAOGA occurred during Zimbabwe's liberation war. Yet the movement's own sacred histories (Guti, 1989; Erwin, c. 1986; Takavarasha, c. 1988 ) and its archives barely mention it. Still a predominantly urban Church, AOGA was relatively unaffected by the war. Unlike main-line missionaries and black clergy on the rural front line, AOGA leaders were not called to mediate between guerrillas, security forces and the peasantry (Hastings, 1979; Hallencreutz, 1988; Bhebe and Ranger, 1995) . Moreover the movement had felt no need to enter the debate about majority rule which preceded the war or subsequently to engage with the opposing sides about the gravity of the political violence that ensued, despite the fact that a number of Church members were among its victims. Nevertheless, AOGA's prayers were answered. By 1979 the movement could muster 10,000 members at a National Big Sunday gathering in the National Sports centre (Erwin, c. 1986: 118) . It had also expanded along migrant labour networks into Malawi and Zambia and was growing rapidly in Mozambique (Guti, 1989 (Guti, , 1995 . AOGA was poised to exploit the new post-colonial dispensation.
ZAOGA, ZIMBABWEAN NATIONALISM AND AMERICAN IMPERIALISM
By 1980 AOGA had evolved considerably. It had grown numerically and socially many of its founder members had become upwardly mobile. The movement's strict work ethic had both created and attracted businessmen and white-collar workers. While it retained a large township base, and would subsequently create a large rural membership, its socially mobile members migrated across the railway lines first into the former coloured suburbs and later into the former white suburbs. No longer did its founder members need to turn their relative deprivation into a mark of grace; they were ready to embrace the world (Bruce, 1996: 218) . More important, there now appeared the opportunity to do so. Zimbabwean independence had opened the political field to black players as well as white. And the religious field was now open to movements like AOGA which had previously been restrained by the missionary monopoly of access to the state. Mission Christianity had been weakened by the wartime flight of expatriate personnel and momentarily compromised by nationalist slurs on its close relation with colonialism. Now that AOGA members 'had access to people in positions of power and judged that they had the numbers to effect changes in political systems, politics became a new game open to them' (Cleary, 1997: 13 Guti, 1989; Maxwell, 2000) . Adrian Hastings has observed 'a marked shift in many [African] countries over the last twenty years from a "traditionalising" to an "internationalising" (even "Americanising") model of independency' (1994b). This is doubtless true, and the shift can even be discerned in the more recent stages of ZAOGA's evolution (Maxwell, 2000 Despite ZAOGA's conversion to the language and practices of development, and its sympathies with cultural nationalism, relations with the ruling party were not good. ZAOGA's highly effective and locally rooted organisational structure gave it a remarkable capacity for rapid multi-ethnic mobilisation, a capacity which the new Zimbabwean government seemed to fear as much as its colonial predecessor (Fields, 1985; Maxwell, 1999 It seems to us that you equate western culture plus capitalism to Christianity and make communism an enemy of both. We wish to make it clear that our stand as church leaders in this country is that Christianity is not a political ideology. We are not here to propagate western imperialism, but to preach a gospel of salvation through the risen Christ ... It seems to us that standing for one's dignity and self identity to your mind turns any black person into a communist that any white government must be helped to eradicate. It is tragic that in purporting to help us reach our people, you used the occasion to betray us.
Although, in retrospect, Mahoney's accusations concerning ethnic violence against the Ndebele were not inaccurate, the born-again leaders were correct in reading his tirade as 'an insult to our sovereignty as a nation'.32
Nevertheless, the Zimbabwean born-again movement, ZAOGA included, burnt its fingers over the Mahoney incident. From the mid1980s onward the movement began to realign within the spectrum of American Christianities. Henceforth, Guti cultivated links with black pentecostals whose doctrines on prosperity, black pride and selfactualisation amplified his own teaching against the Third World mentality: an attitude of fatalism, and deference to whites (Maxwell, 1998) . Although this realignment within American Christianity was, in part, intended to make ZAOGA appear less vulnerable to right-wing causes, the movement had other ideological and material motives. property. Given Sande's undoubted popularity, the Zimbabwean government may have feared a pentecostal punch-up at the rally. Secondly, the movement's Overseer of Zairean Assemblies appeared to have been using his Church identity and transnational connections to facilitate dealings in the arms trade.38 But these two factors are not necessarily at odds with the ruling party's overriding concern that ZAOGA undermined its project of nation building. As a movement which commanded strong loyalties, and loyalties which transcended the Zimbabwean state, ZAOGA evoked notions of citizenship very different from ZANU/PF's hegemonic project for the nation (Werbner, 1991: 158-60).39 But ZAOGA's confrontation with the government came at a pivotal moment in Church-state relations. The signing of the Unity Accord between PF/ZAPU and the ruling party on 22 December 1987 brought about a rapid change in the political climate. 'People were able to direct their attention to the real issues and could air their views without being mistaken as supporters of ZAPU or dissidents, hence being labelled as enemies of the government' (Ncube, 1989: 309) . In this new environment of openness the ruling party's legitimacy rapidly began to wane. ZAOGA doubtless sensed this in its confrontation with the government in 1988. In his subsequent sermon at the National Stadium Guti did preach loyalty to the government. But while the language of his address-sin, backsliding, righteousness-was not overtly confrontational, he did put forward an 'argument of accountability' (Werbner, 1995; Maxwell, 1995) , in itself a moral critique of the status quo.
Recovering from its moral disadvantage in the early 1980s, the Zimbabwean Church now represented new sources of legitimate authority, in contrast to the diminishing authority of ZANU/PF.
ZAOGA AND THE ONE-PARTY STATE: 'THE POLITICS OF THE BELLY'
Dogged by corruption scandals, a poor human rights record and an economic downturn, the ruling party lost legitimacy from 1988 onwards and support from the older historic mission Churches began to decline. Various agencies within the Catholic Church started to voice concern. The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace began to press for democratisation and accountability,40 while the radical Catholic monthly, Moto, revived public concern over the 5th Brigade's ethnic-based violence against the Ndebele.41 Silveria House, an engine of Catholic social teaching, began to critique the newly adopted Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (Balleis, 1992 All of these problems we are facing in Africa, most of them are not our own but it's outside influence which causes us to fight one another. So that they can sell more guns and kill each other. pentecostalism, find their tendency towards unfettered consumption trammelled by the aspirations of the mass at the movement's base.
These developmental contradictions interact with transformational tensions to further complicate ZAOGA's relations to politics. While ZAOGA's leadership articulates itself to the politics of patrimonialism fostered by Zimbabwe's dominant elite factions, those operating at the grass roots have made connections with populist and democratic causes. It is, of course, easy to romanticise the grass-roots culture of the movement. Like all human institutions the local assembly is subject to hierarchy, prejudice and power struggles. Neither can it be considered separately from the politics of the leadership. Some elders and deacons will organise gifts to well placed overseers to secure their patronage (see Maxwell, 1998 ). Nevertheless, in-depth fieldwork in a number of assemblies does point to signs of an alternative egalitarian culture in conflict with that of the dominant faction of leaders.
ZAOGA's dominant elite espouses a clear ideology. Its teachings and practices reproduce the values of liberal capitalism: 'the acquisition of consumer durables and real estate' (Lehmann, 1996: 217) ; the centrality of the nuclear family; the virtues of education, cleanliness and sobriety (Maxwell, 1997) . But this class ideology is clouded by the elite's promotion of a civic consciousness: emphasis on citizenship, obeying the law, respecting property, challenging corruption (Guti, 1989 (Guti, , 1994 ). This consciousness, based on the identity of the total religious community, was fostered in the 1980s by the gathering of the movement together at Deeper Life Conferences, National Big Sundays and rallies of the various ZAOGA associations. By the 1990s the movement had expanded to such a degree that it was forced to decentralise. Big Sundays were restricted to regions and districts within them. Tensions of class, generation and ethnicity have increasingly come to the fore.56
These social divisions are most manifest among the young pastors and Bible school students. Many of these young men (and women) do indeed have nowhere else to go. Often they are from the streets or a poor background, possessing few qualifications. They are reliant on the Church for their training, bride-price and wages. They are a long way from the spoils of power which they see rapidly disappearing up the Church hierarchy. Some make ethnic jokes, complaining that they have not progressed within the movement because they did not marry an Ndau. While the gifted, the well connected and the sycophantic are promoted to richer churches, and the opportunity of extensive gifts from their flocks, most remain poor. While many pastors look up the hierarchy, coveting the wealth of the more fortunate, they are nevertheless vulnerable to 'capture from below' (Campbell, 1995: 142) . Because they are dependent on their local assemblies for their survival these pentecostal foot soldiers are drawn into local struggles for 56 For Latin American comparisons see Gill (1990) The pressure from below can exhibit itself in outright challenges to clerical power. One assembly in the township of Mbare, who described themselves as 'some of the poorest people in Zimbabwe', organised a petition and delegation to headquarters against a greedy pastor who appeared bent on humiliating church members rather than seeking the betterment of the whole religious community (Maxwell, 1998) .
Tensions of class, ethnicity and generation are given added force by the culture of the pentecostal assembly, which itself can pick up messages from the wider society. At the level of the local gathering the disciplined believer participates in a democratic culture of pragmatism and competition. Social relations are remade at the base of the movement, within the 'freespace' of local assembly (Martin, 1990 ). Ethnic and class differences are repatterned in the language of Christian brotherhood, and the marginalised find human dignity. Empowered by the Holy Spirit, women and young people participate fully in assembly leadership and are encouraged to seek greater responsibility in their careers and public life. Prophecy, tongues, healing are all seen as gifts of God. As such they restore dignity to the downtrodden and give them an alternative, divine, authority by which to live. Irrespective of social category, the believer becomes a new person. Henceforth he or she is a person of consequence, value and authority, a 'member of a chosen people, a royal priesthood, a holy nation' (1 Peter 2). The born-again Christian is dressed in God's 'finest robes' and given His 'ring of authority' (Luke 15). Biblical images of personal and communal transformation offer a radical and attractive alternative to the now much discredited political discourse of Marxism-Leninism (see also Martin, 1996: 6-7).
Signs of an alternative plural and egalitarian political culture abound in the life of the assembly. Local-level financial accountability is assured, as tithes and offerings are recorded with mathematical accuracy. In pre-service Bible studies scripture is discussed in an atmosphere conducive to debate and to mutual respect. But, more significantly, elections to the posts of deacons and elders are conducted with great scrupulousness, in marked contrast to the corruption and filibustering that characterise ruling-party politics. In January 1996 there was some disquiet over the elections in the main assembly in Highfields. The contest had taken place too quickly, and some of those in office had been dropped without warning or a chance to stand again. On 14 January a flying squad of two elders from assemblies outside Highfields arrived to officially nullify the results and re-run the election. Having discoursed from the Rules and Policy booklet and checked the credentials of those standing, they oversaw an orderly vote. Once a new set of elders and deacons had been elected to public approval a leading female member of the assembly got up and announced, 'We are not like ZANU/PF. We have a good spirit here.'
Since the movement's beginnings in the early 1960s the egalitarian culture found in its assemblies has in the case ofHighfields been influenced by the radical politics ofthe township, which it did not directly engage with, but nevertheless impinged on the life of the community through rallies, the press, even sports fixtures. We will choose which building we need and not waste time. God said we are going to move the names of other churches and put ours in its place ... The God you will see in this organisation is different. Furthermore the already rich plurality of Zimbabwean Christianity is added to by the inclination of ZAOGA's leadership towards authoritarian control. This authoritarianism has spawned a host of schismatic movements, seeking to escape the dominant faction's centralising dividing the pentecostal field even further.
Often the 'noisiness' of ZAOGA's arrival on the political scene is just that. Contemporary pentecostalism is characterised by a good deal of hype and choreography. Pentecostals are fixated upon size. They tend to exaggerate the scale of their memberships in order to demonstrate God's blessing. Pentecostal leaders have also realised that their often socially marginal flocks like to feel part of a movement 'counting for something in society' (Martin, 1990: 65) . Everyday events are made miraculous in order to convince members that they are part of a unique and anointed movement. The recent update of the movement's canonised history casts Guti as central to the nation's post-civil war experience. The reader is told that during the International Leadership Summit in 1993 Vice-president Muzenda knelt before Guti 'as the apostle of God prayed for the country to be healed' (Guti, 1995: 63 Finally, it is apparent that ZAOGA is seeking to create identities which transcend the nation state. Much of Guti's own preaching and writing focuses on a pan-African identity delivered from its deference to whites and proud of its heritage, which claims the Christian mantle from the secularised and apostate Western Church. At other times ZAOGA places itself squarely in the global born-again movement.
CONCLUSION THE SENSE OF PENTECOSTAL PRACTICE
By considering pentecostalism's relations with both elite and grassroots cultures this article offers insights into its capacity to renew politics. More specifically it sheds light on the debate between Gifford and Martin concerning the power of local creativity, summarised in the introduction. While Gifford's vigorous commitment to political change is praiseworthy, his brusque dismissal of Martin's thesis is unfounded. It is difficult to see how Gifford arrives at his conclusions, given that there is precious little evidence of culture in his work. For him African Christianity is the faith of religious elites: religious NGOs, church councils, pastoral statements, conferences and conventions. There is only very limited evidence of research in townships or rural locations, considering the reception, localisation and manipulation of elite discourses. Such detailed ethnographic case studies might have enlightened him on the 'sense' of pentecostalism, not in his own terms but on those of the believers. Given the persistence of patrimonialism in African politics (Gifford, 1998 : 5-8), surely a cultural change in values is necessary for the political process to 'work'67 and for structural change to endure.
However, while Martin's work shows much more sensitivity to the idioms and culture of pentecostalism, and its varied response to politics, he nevertheless downplays its tendency to authoritarianism and linked propensity to the politics of corporatism and clientelism (perhaps because the significant Latin American forays into politics occurred after his study; Freston, 1994) . At present the highly authoritarian governmental structure of ZAOGA is in tension with forces contributing to a democratic political culture: egalitarianism within the local assembly, new religious identities, empowerment by the spirit. In the long run the movement's contribution to politics will hinge on the eventual balance between these two tendencies.
Moreover, while Martin makes a sound case from precedent for pentecostalism's capacity to renew political culture, he again downplays external transformative influences which might themselves change religious culture. Pentecostalism's lack of religious tradition, its scorn for formal theological education, its reliance on lay initiative, its 67 Here I am in agreement with Chabal and Daloz (1999) that the current state of African politics 'works' for elites and their clients but, as this article has made plain, many consider politics to be failing them. acceptance of supernatural explanations, all make it particularly responsive to local and national agendas. It is possible that ZAOGA will not renew society but be renewed by it, picking up messages from student and trade union movements, lawyers and journalists, NGOs and human rights organisations, pressing for political rights, due legal process and social justice. Or perhaps external and internal tendencies towards egalitarianism will join forces. As President Mugabe grows more removed from his people, and more unpopular, so too does Guti. The comparison is not lost on ZAOGA members. 
